

Saša Cvijetić

**THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION:  
FROM “INEVITABILITY WITHOUT A TIMETABLE”  
TO THE POLICY CONUNDRUM AND BACK**



ICCR-IFS-CIR

The Interdisciplinary Centre for Comparative Research in the Social Sciences

Vienna-Paris

## **The EU Enlargement: “Inevitability Without a Timetable”**

Enlargement of the European Union (EU) to include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) will undoubtedly be one of the most important and most complex political and economic processes in the upcoming decades. It is indeed difficult to overestimate the significance of this endeavour for political stability and economic prosperity of the Old Continent. Enormous efforts are and will be required on both “sides” – on the part of the EU and its current Member States and on the part of the countries in transition aspiring to become members. The eternal dilemma between ‘widening’ (i.e. admitting new members) and ‘deepening’ (i.e. moving toward greater political, economic and monetary integration) is progressively perceived as expressing two-sided necessity – it is hard to conceive the possibility of the European Union not enlarging eastwards as much as it is highly unlikely that European integration will be halted. Both processes, of course, have their adversaries (and often even ardent enemies) – whose influence cannot be neglected or ignored. If nothing else, this resistance is already a sufficient reason to address the fundamental features of the Union today and to attempt to devise strategies that would lead towards successful and sustainable advancement of the European integration project.

It is only in the context of dynamism that both the processes within the EU and those in the CEE can be understood. Transitions to democracy and market economy in countries of post-Communist Europe are (too) often perceived as unidirectional undertakings of these countries to “catch up” with the developed “West.” This simplified view neglects existing social structures and cultural patterns in these countries, at the same time failing to understand that the “West” is also facing multi-faceted challenges to functioning of its political and economic systems. To use somewhat different terminology, the “trajectory” is not a vector: it does not have a definite length, it is not a straight line and it does not have a defined orientation.

Hence, in order to be able to face the challenges posed by enlargement, both parts will have to undergo considerable reform. While that is considered as a natural course of actions for the Accession Countries that have embarked upon all-



embracing political, economic, legal and social transformation in the early 1990s, the same cannot be said in the case of the Union and its Member States. Some authors in fact argue that the main burden of reform lays on the Union (for instance, Mayhew 1998). While various attempts have been made (notably in the Commission's communication 'Agenda 2000' and in the conclusions of the Berlin European Council concerning the financial aspects of the reform), the main problems have still not been tackled. Institutional restructuring and adaptation/reform of major common policies are only the most discernible challenges that the Union will have to take in hand.

Enlargement is thus, albeit arguably the most striking, not the only trigger for reforms within the Union. European governance and its legitimacy have been questioned notwithstanding the number of Member States through perpetual quandary between supranational and inter-governmental models of co-operation. Whether one of these models will become dominant (or indeed satisfactorily conciliated with the other), depends, of course, on interests and preferences of (presumably rational) actors, constrained by given institutional structures.

Different scenarios were developed to describe possible outcomes based on dissimilar preferences and behaviour of various actors (see for instance: Bertrand, Michalski and Pench (1999), Tsebelis and Garrett (2000), Hayes Renshaw and Wallace (1997)). While these scenarios account for different institutional preferences in the field of government (i.e. executive, legislative and partly also judicial politics) and politics (taking into account political cleavages, democratic foundations of the Union's political system as well as interest representation), we will attempt here to draw a sketch for developments in the field of policy-making, especially in the light of the upcoming enlargement. In doing so, we will however not neglect these other aspects, since it is only in the framework of a complex web of simultaneous and intertwined pursuits by all the actors that the future of European integration can be analysed.

## **Policy Outputs of the EU Institutions**

Five types of EU institutions' policy outputs can be distinguished (Hix 1999):

1. *Regulatory policies*, that is rules on exchange of goods, capital and services where the cost of policy implementation is not borne by the EU institutions. The example for these are rules on Single Market, harmonisation of national standards, environmental regulation, social regulation, and competition policies.
2. *Redistributive policies*, which shape the transfer of resources through the EU budget from one Member State or social group to other. These include Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), cohesion policy and research and development policy.
3. *Macroeconomic and stabilisation policies* are related to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and include policies on money supply, interest rate, exchange rate, co-operation on fiscal and unemployment policies, etc.
4. *Citizen policies*, such as justice and home affairs, EU citizenship and common asylum and immigration policies
5. *Global policies* which determine the EU's international political and economic relations.

While the first two policies are largely supranational, the other three are not, with partial exemption of the macroeconomic and stabilisation policies which can be regarded as a kind of mixture between the two.

It is supranational policies that we are going to concentrate on here. More precisely, we shall seek to explore the linkage between the *redistributive policies* (most notably the cohesion policy) and *regulatory policies* (such as transport – typical field where de-regulatory policy is dominant – and environment and social policies, also called re-regulatory policies<sup>1</sup>). These two types of policies are already closely inter-related in the current Union, and this interface will become even more complex in the course of enlargement, not the least because of considerable budgetary implications that the enlargement is going to have.

## **Regulatory Policies – ‘Key Instrument of Modern Governance’**

---

<sup>1</sup> While de-regulatory policies are those that prescribe abolishment of previously existing national rules (so-called negative integration), re-regulatory policies are those where previous national rules are replaced with common EU rules (positive integration). (Hix 1999)

## **Social Policy**

It is widely acknowledged that “welfare state is national state” (de Swaan, 1992) and that EU’s competencies in this realm reserved for nation-states are limited. Several authors disagree with this understanding, though (see, for instance, Leibfried and Pierson, 1996). They claim that the EU did put in question both legal authority and regulatory capacity of the Member States in the area of social policy and that the very logic of establishment of the Single Market made it increasingly difficult not to deal with the social policy issues at the EU level. Leibfried and Pierson further hold that strict separation between ‘market-related issues’ and ‘social issues’ is unsustainable, since economic action is always entrenched within compact networks of political and social institutions.

Three types of processes that characterise the policy-making in the area of social policy can be distinguished (p. 187):

- Positive activist reform initiatives to create areas of competence for harmonised social standards in the entire EU (such as: health and safety regulation, equal treatment of women and men, etc.)
- Negative reform through enforcement of market compatibility requirements (notably freedom of movement for workers, social services)
- Indirect pressures for integration that provoke changes in national welfare states (as imposed by the EMU or plans for harmonisation of national fiscal policies, for instance)

Scharpf (1994) concludes that the “policy-making capacities of the Union have not been strengthened nearly as much as capabilities at the level of Member States have declined.”

The EU’s social policy is not social policy *strictu sensu*, since it does not provide health and social care. It is rather “social regulation”, since it addresses market failures and does not redistribute resources (Majone, 1994). However, Hix (1999) claims that this re-regulatory policy has important indirect redistributive effect, since it

represents a downward pressure on Member States with high social policy standards and upward pressure on those with low standards.

### ***Environmental Policy***

Much unlike social policy, the EU has gradually become a key policy-maker in the field of environmental protection. Taking into account the fact that before the Single European Act (SEA), environment was not at all included into treaties, it is amazing how the EU managed to bring about this field to the best example of the EU as a 'regulatory state'. The impetus has been provided mainly by a small number of Member States ('leaders') with high criteria for environmental protection (notably Germany and Scandinavian countries), which imposed their standards to the others ('laggards') (Sbragia, 1996). This "up-market environmentalism" is a best example of "fusion of national and transnational policy-making." (Wessels, 1992).

However, another important feature of EU environmental policy is so-called "implementation deficit" (von Homeyer, 2000). There is hardly any sub-field of this policy that was implemented to national legislation smoothly and without delays. (Jordan, 1999) There are even (official) allegations that proliferation of EU legislation did not help to rectify the environmental problems in the EU (European Environment Agency, 1999). Buck, Krämer and Wilkinson (1999) actually claim that the most important accomplishment was actually the inclusion of environmental concerns into virtually all other sectoral policies of the EU.

### ***Transport Policy***

Already the Treaty of Rome attributed great significance to the field of transport. The transport did not represent only an object, but also an instrument of European integration, since it plays a key role of transport in development of international trade. The EU enjoys large competencies in the field of transport, and the reasons are both economic and political. Economically, the necessity of a common transport policy was double: transport is not only a means for free circulation of goods, but is also a service in its own right, which absorbs 7% of the GDP and 7% of employment

(CCE/Groupe Transport 2000, 1991: 5). Politically, there is a long tradition of state interventionism in the area of transport (related to prices, tariffs, infrastructure, access to market, fiscal arrangements, etc.)

In spite of this initial recognition of importance, the progress in this field remained limited in the first two decades. It is only the preparations and implementation of the Single Market that helped the transport policy be re-launched into the EU political arena. Several actions were undertaken (liberalisation in road and rail transport, harmonisation of social and technical norms and taxes on vehicles, funding of infrastructure by the Community, development of Trans-European Networks, etc.) However, de-regulation (negative integration) was dominant over harmonisation (positive integration).

However, many authors stress (see, for instance, Dehousse 1994) the incapability of the Community to put in place a concept addressing the entirety of transport system and claim that the Treaty of European Union (TEU) favoured normative and infrastructural approach (following administrative logic), instead of recourse to fiscal measures. Dehousse also points to structural contradiction between Common Transport Policy and protection of environment.

### ***Re-regulation vs. de-regulation***

Despite all criticism, one cannot but acknowledge the success of the European Union in the field of regulation, especially if one takes into account the fact that nearly 80% of the EU budget goes to redistributive policies (such as CAP and structural funds). How can this *furie réglementaire* be explained? Majone (1996) explains this in a neo-functional way by “expansive logic of sectoral integration”, whereby the major bulk of initiatives came not from the Commission but from the Member States and organised interests. Commission was keen to provide its ‘services’ in this respect – one has to bear in mind that costs of regulation for the EU budget are minimal, while the space for Commission’s increase in influence is large.<sup>2</sup> Member States, in turn,

---

<sup>2</sup> Majone states (1996: 65) that “the utility function of the Commission is positively related to the scope of its competencies rather than to the scale of the services provided or to the size of the budget.”

engaged into this 'policy innovation' in order to increase international credibility of their policy choices and reduce the power of redistributive coalitions at domestic level.

This "regulatory expansion" also raises the question of the role of the EU bureaucracy which is left with relatively large margins of regulatory discretion. Commission's capacity to act as policy entrepreneur has grown, which brings the well known issue of democratic deficit of EU institutions into the game. It is especially in that context that it can be observed that the "regulatory federalism" has two possible directions – centralisation (as in the current case) or decentralisation, i.e. subsidiarity. It will be very interesting to observe in what direction the developments will head in the context of enlargement.

There are two evident facts to be stressed here. First, the European Union has been much more progressive in adopting de-regulatory policies than the re-regulatory ones, i.e. it achieved much more in liberalisation than in harmonisation. Single Market (an inherently de-regulatory project) has indeed been one of spectacular success stories of the European integration. 280 legislative acts have been passed, most notably in the field of removing of barriers to trade and competition policy (state aids, mergers and acquisitions, anti-trust rules). European Court of Justice played here a very important role, setting some benchmarks in deregulatory policies (for instance, famous *Cassis de Dijon* case).

Second, as far as re-regulatory policies are concerned, the EU has much better record in "product-related" than in "process-related" legislation. Typical example was already pointed out: environmental vs. social policy. On product standards, consensus is much more easily reached, since Member States prefer both high and low standards to no standards at all. On process standards, however, consensus is very difficult to build, since here no agreement is more desirable than either common low standards (frowned upon by the richer states, scared of possible 'social dumping') or common high standards (which the poorer states fear will further decrease their competitiveness). Furthermore, different organised interests also play a role (see Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1997). Hix (1999) believes that resistance to

process-related legislation stems also from their indirect redistributive effect, as mentioned before.

## **Redistributive Policies – Union’s ‘Santa Claus’**

### ***Cohesion policy***

There are several explanations why EU engaged into (nowadays very sizeable) budgetary transfers to certain regions and social groups.

Allen (1996) speaks about deliberate political ambitions of the European Union (that allegedly wants to see Europe as an “Europe of Regions” in which nation-states lose some of their omnipotent features) to promote this so-called “multi-level governance”. Frazer (1994) sees, on the other hand, financial flows from structural funds as side-payments aimed at facilitating large package deals (thus, a kind of “horse trading”). He warns about “clear conflict between the competition objectives of the treaties, designed to enhance the working of the market, and the idea of using the structural funds to achieve cohesion by overcoming regional disparities, but in way that has to be seen as inhibiting the working of the market”. Rumford (2000) promotes a totally opposing notion of cohesion. In his view, cohesion is aimed at fostering competitiveness and is shaped by globalisation pressures accommodated in this way by the EU (in other words, the cohesion policy serves to stimulate convergence between regional economies, and not regional incomes (Buffachi and Garmise, 1995)). The EU itself speaks about cohesion as a tool for attaining macro-economic goals set by the perspective of joining the EMU. Hix (1999) attributes to cohesion policy classic normative redistribution goals, i.e. understand it as an attempt to reduce disparities between different regions and social groups in the EU.

Regardless of which of these rationales is taken, and notwithstanding the actual achievements of the cohesion policy in reducing economic and social disparities in the EU, it is clear that the final outcome of cohesion policy is redistribution of financial resources. It is also true that, since their introduction in mid-1970s, the amount of expenditure on structural funds (and later also cohesion fund) has undergone

enormous increases to reach 35.7% of all budgetary commitments of the Union in 1999 (largely at the expense of the decrease in funding for the CAP).

It is therefore only understandable that the expenditure on cohesion policy (and redistributive policies in general) is one of the most contested issues in the Union. There is hardly any actor in the game that does not see its position at stake – even more so considering the perspective of enlargement, which will undoubtedly require major reshuffling of these policies.

### **Linkage Between Redistributive and Regulatory Policies**

There are two levels of analysis of linkage between regulatory and redistributive policies. The first one relates to grand game of intergovernmental bargaining about the entirety of EU policies, the second is about the mixture of policy goals at the level of implementation. This holds both for the current EU and for considerations related to enlargement.

The EU budget (although pretty small in magnitude – it represents only 1.27% of the Union's GDP) and its allotments are an outcome of successive negotiations within the EU. Carrubba (1997) describes the rule that governs these negotiations: each government is keen to balance the gains/losses from other policies (notably regulatory policies) and payments/takings to/from the budget. That implies that the budget composition shifted in favour of expenditure for redistributive policies because a growing number of Member States (especially after each enlargement) was seeking financial compensations from the budget. Frieden (1991) in fact claims that the redistribution is not based on actual wealth of the country, but on the chances that the country becomes a loser in the process of liberalisation (exemptions are Denmark and UK, which received large contributions from the EU – Denmark is indeed a net recipient – mainly due to their general anti-EU stance). Another reason for poorer countries to stand very strong for these budget transfers is the fact that these transfers represent non-negligible share of their national budget income (raising up to 8.8% in Greece in 1995).

Organised interests and regions in the EU also clearly recognise the benefits (or setbacks, depending on the point of view) of EU's redistributive policies. Lobbies (whether sectoral or regional) abound in Brussels, trying to exert pressure on the Union's bureaucracy. The Commission, in turn, tries to steer the game skilfully by playing on the card of "stimulating multi-level governance" in order to achieve its goals.

Hix (1999) stresses another very important feature of redistributive policies, namely the immense problems linked with their potential reforms. Only an external shock, Hix claims, can provide a ground for major (and necessary) reforms. It goes without saying that enlargement is one of such shocks.

Before focusing on issues related to enlargement, let us still briefly explicate on the second level where the policy goals of the European Union combine. The EU's policy-makers have namely been consistent in including the typically regulatory policies as "objects" of redistributive policies. If one takes a look into distribution of objectives in both the old systematisation of structural and cohesion funds and the new one (as proposed by the Agenda 2000), one can easily observe that these funds have been used for projects in transport and environment (Cohesion Fund is almost entirely oriented to these two areas) or to social policy related issues (employment through European Social Fund, etc.)

### **How Will European Policies Be Affected by Enlargement?**

"Agenda 2000" (1997) sets the framework for changes that the should be put into practice in the Union in the forthcoming period. Its main goals are the following:

- The EU budget should not exceed 1.27% of the common GDP in the period 2000-2006
- Expenditure for structural funds should not exceed the current level of 0.46% of EU's GDP in the same period, while the transfers cannot amount to more than 4% of the recipient's country GDP

- Common Agricultural Policy has to be reformed in order to move from price support to income support mechanism

The reforms of redistributive policies would be necessary even without enlargement. Distorted price systems, high subsidies and interventionism in foreign trade led to overproduction and malfunctioning of the agricultural sector in the Union. On the other hand, the structural funds cover far larger share of the EU population (51%) than actually necessary and concentration and prioritisation are necessary (Mayhew, 1998).

We will try to inspect what the most probable outcomes of policy reforms and what the linkage between redistributive and regulatory policies in these circumstances will be.

### ***Social policy***

As indicated, the body of EU legislation in the field of social policy is not enormously large. However, this does not mean that there would be no problem concerning the implementation of the social *acquis* in the new Member States nor that EU should insist on accepting all rules without derogations or transition periods. The arguments of the new Member States will actually be similar to the arguments of those within the existing Union that rejected stronger integration in the field of social policy. The economies of these countries are not sufficiently competitive even without high social standards being imposed on them. Thus, the adoption of minimum requirements and the successive move toward application of more stringent rules might be a reasonable compromise. This refers to regulation related to harmonisation of labour law and protection of health and safety at work. Rules applying to movement of labour are certainly going to be dealt with in another package, given the sensibility of the issue for some current Member States. As far as combating unemployment is concerned (which can indeed decrease after these countries join the EU), the approach of the EU to this issue has largely been inter-governmental (reflected in the new Treaty chapter included in Amsterdam) and the new Member States can (should) join these endeavours.

### ***Environmental policy***

We have seen that the EU already has problems with implementation of the environmental *acquis*, and the problem could only deteriorate upon enlargement. Not only that implementation of certain regulations entails enormous costs (for instance, only Poland would need to spend 35 billion € to implement environmental standards), but it also assumes other prerequisites, such as adequately trained staff, etc. Here again, similar to the social policy, one has to devise strategy so that the blinded reproduction of environmental regulations does not impede economic development and growth in these countries. As Rambow (2000) stresses, clear scale of priorities has to be set, starting from product-related standards through horizontal provisions, process-related standards and cross-border pollution, to nature protection. He concludes, however, that the enlargement would not provoke major shifts in contents of the EU environmental policy.

### ***Transport Policy***

The problems already existing in the field of transport policy can certainly be aggravated by enlargement. The transition which is in course in the candidate countries significantly increased the intensity of trade and all types of exchange with the Union. The transport needs are growing very rapidly. The candidate countries do not have sufficient public resources necessary to satisfy these needs and they consequently turn toward either private operators or institutions of the European Union. Priorities are therefore development of infrastructure, which in concrete terms means corridors embedded in the Trans-European Networks (TEN) and extension of rail and road networks within the countries themselves.

### ***Cohesion policies***

The most obvious problem with enlargement and cohesion policies is the enormous impact of inclusion of the new Member States for budgetary expenditure under the title of structural and cohesion funds. It is clear that the regions in new Member

States would fall within the scope of Objective 1 of the structural funds (GDP per capita lower than 75% of the EU average) while entire countries would be covered by the Cohesion Fund (GDP per capita lower than 90% of the EU average). On the other hand, being relatively poor countries, they would not contribute significantly to the EU budget. (Delegation du Senat Français pour l'Union Européenne, 1996). "Agenda 2000" thus prescribes the transition period for these (which would logically also call for transition period for the contributions, since the costs of accepting the *acquis communautaire* are going to be exceptionally high). The reform of the structural funds envisaged by the "Agenda 2000" before the enlargement also includes concentration of objectives – there would be three instead of six<sup>3</sup> – which would cover 35-40% of the EU population. Berlin European Council (March 1999) provided the detailed criteria for allocation of resources and the figures.

Thus, in the last year of the next financial period (2006), total costs of enlargement would amount to 16.78 billion €, out of which 3.4 billion € would go for the CAP, 12.08 billion for the cohesion policies, 850 million € for other internal policies and 450 million € for the costs of administration. (These figures were calculated with the assumption that six countries join the Union in the first instance.) Expenditure for cohesion policies will represent 41% of the overall EU budget (increase by 5.3% as compared with 1999 figures). 69.7% of this sum would be spent on the Objective 1 programmes.

These costs are expected to be covered by "growth bonus" and reorganisation of spendings. There is a plenitude of literature that attempts to account for different scenarios and gives proposals either to the EU or the candidate countries in this respect (Tsoukalis, 1993; Besnainou, 1995; de Crombrugge, Minton-Beddeos, Sachs, 1996; Mayhew, 1998; Rambow, 2000).

---

<sup>3</sup> Objective 1 will serve to promote the development and structural adjustment of regions whose development is lagging behind (regions whose GDP per capita is less than 75% of the EU average, remote region (former Objective 6). Objective 2 supports the economic and social conversion of areas facing structural difficulties (areas undergoing economic and social change in the industrial and service sectors, declining rural areas, urban areas in difficulty and depressed areas dependent on fisheries). Objective 3 is designed to facilitate the adaptation and modernisation of policies and systems of education, training and employment.

De Crombrugghe, Minton-Beddeos and Sachs (1996: 27) are most radical in their approach to the issue of structural adjustments: “The applicant countries should renounce their claims on EU structural funds, both because they do not need them and because the fears amongst some EU countries about the diversion of structural funds now represents a large hurdle to quick accession. In fact, reliance on structural funds would probably worsen the political culture in new members.” They thus propose to abandon this cohesion policy and to rely much more strongly to the competition policy. Tsoukalis (1993) is in line with such thinking: “Funds allocated are not large enough to make a significant difference either to regional disparities or to convergence, even though the income from the funds is significant for the poorer states.” Allen (1996) subscribes to that: “Structural funds alone were not designed to bring about cohesion, but to supplement the workings of the free market and the general economic policies of the Member States – a factor that might be worth bearing in mind when considering the future of these funds, and clearly a factor that can be used by the Member States to rationalise the fact that the overall size of structural funds, even at their peak, is insufficient to make any significant impact on either regional or national disparities within the EU”.

However, as legitimate as these viewpoints are from a purely economic point of view, it is well known that the cohesion policy has served another purpose, namely to catalyse and legitimise major agreements within the EU. Member States have explicitly chosen to fund some domestic clients through European mechanisms rather than through national budgets and financial incentives were often taken as a necessary element in securing consensus (Rieger, 1995). It is very unlikely that, given the scale of issues related with eastward enlargement, this approach would now be abandoned. That is why most authors acknowledge that some kind of compromise will be necessary. Agenda 2000 actually provides a sound (if not very generous) approach to this: transfers limited to 4% of the recipient country’s GDP as well as transition period for phasing-out of current beneficiary regions and increase in transfers to regions in the new Member States. That some current recipients will fall outside the scope set by the criteria of structural and cohesion funds is logical (since the inclusion of new Member States would lower the GDP per capita of the EU as a whole, in spite of the growth factor). Berlin European Council allocated considerable

amount of resources for transition of these regions. Gradual approach also makes sense taking into account the fact that absorption capabilities of the new Member States (at least initially) would be relatively low.

### **Linkage Between Redistributive and Regulatory Policies in the Context of Enlargement**

Mayhew (1998) proposes an alternative that is also politically feasible, but nevertheless includes elements of significant reform: instead of usage of structural funds, he suggests the creation of a major regional cohesion fund, that would finance environmental and infrastructure projects. If the same rules were applied as for the current cohesion fund (85% of EU's financing share rather than 50% as in structural funds), this could prove beneficial both for the new Member States (since it would increase absorption capabilities and foster their competitiveness) and for the old ones.

In order to prepare the candidate countries for accession, several instruments were devised. The PHARE was reoriented from demand-driven to accession-driven programmes and considerable amount of finance for other types of pre-accession assistance was granted in Berlin. A total of 21.8 billion € was allocated there for pre-accession aid in the financial period 2000-2006. This sum is much higher than expected, but still insufficient considering the needs of candidate countries arising from adaptation to the Union's *acquis*. Mayhew (1998) warns also about lack of clear orientations (for instance, of social policy) which puts additional strain on the candidate countries.

It has to be stated, however, that the approach of creating pre-accession funds is beneficial for the candidate countries and, especially if they are even more explicitly used in a way similar to the structural funds, it could definitely facilitate problems related to accession. Transport fund (ISPA) is just one example of such initiatives.

Let us however finally move from normative considerations to the realm of objective interests.

## Enlargement: A Largest Horse-Trading Ever?

Ágh (1999) reminds that social costs of accession can be taken into account and regional disparities can be diminished only through the active involvement of a wide range of policy actors in the institutionalised policy-making process.

It is indeed certain – there will be extremely many actors on the stage (both stars and extras), and it is almost impossible to foresee how the play will advance. Governments, civil servants, political parties, lobbies, business people, managers, trade union leaders, workers, farmers, NGO activists – will all complain about costs (more loudly) and count benefits (more silently), making the usual mistake of presenting the future EU costs as mainly being the costs of enlargement and costs of transition as being the costs of joining the EU. (Fink-Hafner, 2000)

Two dangers are hiding in this predicament. First, similar to previous occasions, issues which are totally unconnected to each other will be an object of grand bargaining – not only that the horse-trading will take place between different policies, but (even more dangerously) between matters related to enlargement and those not at all.

Second, inclusion of such a huge number of actors in the process of policy-making may lead to policy immobilism. It is, for instance, very indicative that the European Commission announced on 9 March 2000 that it would start negotiations with Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Malta on science and research, SMEs, education, foreign relations and common foreign and security policy, considering them obviously as those areas where the advancements have already been made and where no major obstacles to a compromise are expected. So, areas which are problematic are left to be dealt with “later”.

When is that “later” going to be? Jacobsen (1997) correctly notices that the enlargement may be inevitable but is not urgent. And where is the destination? Giscard d’Estaing’s famous sentence from 1995 (“Si la Communauté Européenne

réussissait à survivre et même à progresser, c'était au prix d'une ambiguïté persistente sur son objectif ultime.") enlightens extremely well the major features of the European integration in the 50 odd years of its existence. Wallace (1997) adds an element of deliberate choice in this: "The history of European integration has always been one of indirection – of deliberately not defining the ultimate destination". Is "inevitable" eastward enlargement not an excellent opportunity to reconsider this "strategy"?

## Literature

*Agenda 2000, The Challenge of Enlargement* (1997), COM (97) 2000, Brussels

Ágh, Attila (1999): 'Europeanisation of Policy-Making in East Central Europe: the Hungarian Approach to EU Accession', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6(5): 839-54

Allen, David (1996): *Cohesion and Structural Adjustment*, in: Wallace, William, Wallace, Helen: *Policy-Making in the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Avery, Graham, Cameron, Fraser (1998): *The Enlargement of the European Union*, Sheffield Academic Press

Baldwin, Richard E. (1994): *Towards an Integrated Europe*, London: CEPR

Baldwin, R.E., François, J.F., Portes, R. (1997): 'The Costs and Benefits of Eastern Enlargement: The Impact on the EU and Central Europe', *Economic Policy*, 24: 127-76

Bertelsmann Stiftung Forschungsgruppe Europa (Hrgs.) (1998): *Kosten, Nutzen und Chancen der Osterweiterung für die EU*, Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung

Bertrand, Gilles, Michalski, Anna, Pench, Lucio R. (1999): *Scenarios Europe 2010 – Five Possible Futures for Europe*, Brussels: European Commission, Forward Studies Unit

Besnainou, D. (1995): 'Les fonds structurels: quelle application aux PECO?', *Économie internationale*, 2: 215-32

Brinar, Irena, Svetličič, Marjan (1999): 'Enlargement of the EU: the Case of Slovenia', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6(5)

Buck, Matthias, Krämer, R. Andreas, Wilkinson, David (1999): 'Der Cardiff-Prozess zur integration von Umweltschutzbelangen in andere Sektorpolitiken', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B48(99)

Buffachi, V., Garmise, S. (1995): 'Social Justice in Europe: An Evaluation of European Regional Policy', *Government and Opposition*, 30(2): 179-97

Carrubba, C. (1997): 'Net financial Transfers in the European Union. Who Gets What and Why?', *The Journal of Politics*, 59(2): 469-96

CCE/Groupe Transport 2000 (1991): *Vers un réseau européen des systèmes de transport*, Bruxelles: CCE



Checkel, Jeffrey (1999): 'Social Construction and Integration', *Journal of European Public Policy* 6(4): 545-60

Christiansen, Thomas, Jørgensen, Knud Erik, Wiener, Antje (1999): 'The Social Construction of Europe', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6(4): 528-44

Conclusions of the Berlin European Council (March 1999):  
[http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/daily/03\\_99/doc\\_99\\_1.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/daily/03_99/doc_99_1.htm)

de Crombrugghe, A., Minton-Beddeos, Z., Sachs, J.D. (1996): *EU Membership for Central Europe: Commitments, Speed and Conditionality*, Cahiers de la Faculté des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, 29: Namur

de Swaan, A. (1992): 'Perspectives for Transnational Social Policy', *Government and Opposition*, 27(1): 33-52

Dehousse, Franklin (1996): *La politique sociale européenne*, Collège d'Europe, Université de Liège, Université Robert Schuman

Dehousse, Franklin, Zwald, Thomas (1994): *La politique commune des transports et l'environnement*, Collège d'Europe, Université de Liège, Université Robert Schuman

Dehousse, Franklin (1997): *Les résultats de la conférence intergouvernementale*: Collège d'Europe, Université de Liège

Delegation du Sénat Français pour l'Union Européenne (1996): *Union Européenne: les conséquences économiques et budgétaires de l'élargissement à l'est*. Paris

European Environment Agency (1999): *Environment in the European Union at the Turn of the Century*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities

Fierke, K.M., Wiener, Antje (1999): 'Constructing Institutional Interests: EU and NATO Enlargement', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6(5): 721-42

Fink-Hafner, Danica (1999): 'Dilemmas in managing the Expanding EU: the EU and Applicant States' Point of View', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6(5): 783-801

Frazer, T. (1994): 'The New Structural Funds, State Aids and Interventions in the Single Market', *European Law Review*, 20(1): 3-19

Frieden, J.A. (1991): 'Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance', *International Organization*, 45(4): 425-51

Grabbe, Heather, Hughes, Kirsty (1998): *Enlarging the EU Eastwards*, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs

Hayes Renshaw, Fiona, Wallace, Helen (1997): *The Council of Ministers*, New York: St. Martin's Press

Héritier, Adrienne (1996): 'The Accommodation of Diversity in European Policy Making and Its Outcome: Regulatory Policy as a Patchwork', *EUI Working Papers*, 96: Florence: EUI

Héritier, P. et al. (1991): *Les enjeux de l'Europe social*, Paris: La Découverte

Hix, Simon (1999): *The Political System of the European Union*, New York: St. Martin's Press

Jacobsen, Hanns-D. (1997): 'The EU's Eastward Enlargement', *EioP*, 1(14)  
<http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-014a.htm>



- Jordan, Andrew (1999): 'The Implementation of EU Environmental Policy Without a Political Solution?', *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, 17
- Kramer, Heinz (1993): 'The EC's Response to the New Eastern Europe', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 31(2)
- Lamers, Karl (1994): *A German Agenda for the EU*, London: Federal Trust for Education and Research, Konrad Adenauer Foundation
- Liebfried, Stephan, Pierson, Paul (1992): 'Prospects for Social Europe', *Politics and Society*, 20(3): 333-66
- Liebfried, Stephan, Pierson, Paul (1996): *Social Policy*, in: Wallace, William, Wallace, Helen: *Policy-Making in the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Mayhew, Allan (1998): *Recreating Europe: The European Union's Policy Towards Central and Eastern Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Majone, Giandomenico (1993): 'The European Community Between Social Policy and Social Regulation', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 31(2): 153-70
- Majone, Giandomenico (1996a): *A European Regulatory State?*, in: Richardson, Jeremy (Ed.): *European Union: Power and Policy Making*, London: Routledge
- Majone, Giandomenico (1996b): *Regulating Europe*, London: Routledge
- Mény, Yves, Muller, Pierre, Quermonne, Jean-Louis (eds.) (1996): *Adjusting to Europe: The Impact of the EU on National Institutions and Policies*, London and New York: Routledge
- Neunreither, Karlheinz, Wiener, Antje (eds.) (2000): *European Integration After Amsterdam: Institutional Dynamics and Prospects for Democracy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- New Policy Guidelines for the PHARE Programme in the Framework of Pre-Accession Assistance*, (1997): Information Note of the European Commission
- Rambow, Gerhard (2000): 'The EU Enlargement and Its Impact on European Policies', Paper presented at the TRANSTALK conference, Brussels, 29-31 May 2000
- Rieger, Elmar (1995): 'Der Wandel der Landwirtschaft in der EU. Ein Beitrag zur soziologischen Analyse transnationaler Integrationsprozesse', *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Soziopsychologie*, 47(1): 65-94
- Rumford, Chris (2000): 'European cohesion? globalisation, autonomisation, and the dynamics of EU integration', Paper presented at the TRANSTALK conference, Brussels, 29-31 May 2000
- Sandholtz, W. and Stone Sweet, A. (1997): 'European Integration and Supranational Governance', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 4(3): 297-317
- Sbragia, Alberta (1996): *Environmental Policy: The "Push-pull" of Policy-Making*, in: Wallace, William, Wallace, Helen: *Policy-Making in the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Scharpf, F.W. (1994): 'Mehrebenenpolitik im vollendeten Binnenmarkt', *Staatswissenschaft und Staatspraxis*, 5(4): 475-502
- Smith, Martin A., Timmins, Graham (1999): 'The EU and NATO Enlargement in Comparative Perspective: A Case of Incremental Linkage', *West European Politics*, 22(3): 22-40
- Stawarska, Renata (1999): 'EU Enlargement from the Polish Perspective', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6(5): 829-38

- Symes, V. (1995): *Unemployment in Europe*, London: Routledge
- Telo, M. (dir.) (1995): *Quelle union sociale européenne?*, Bruxelles: Editions de l'Université libre de Bruxelles
- Tsebelis, George, Garrett, Geoffrey (2000): 'Legislative Politics in the European Union', *European Union Politics*, 1(1): 9-36
- Tsoukalis, L. (1993): *The New European Economy: The Politics and Economics of Integration*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- von Homeyer, Ingmar (2000): 'Enlarging EU Environmental Policy: The Challenges of Flexibility and Integration', Paper presented at the TRANSTALK conference, Brussels, 29-31 May 2000
- Wallace, Helen (1998): 'The EU Needs to Confront Enlargement Reality', *European Dialogue*, 3
- Wallace, William (1996): *Government Without Statehood: the Unstable Equilibrium*, in: Wallace, William, Wallace, Helen: *Policy-Making in the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Wallace, William (1997): 'On the Move – Destination Unknown', *World Today*, 53(4)
- Wallace, William, Wallace, Helen (1996): *Policy-Making in the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Wessels, Wolfgang (1992): 'Staat und (westeuropäische) Integration: die Fusionsthese', *Politische Vierteljahresschaft*, Sonderheft 23/99: 36-61
- White Paper on the Preparations of the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into the Internal Market of the Union* (1995): COM (95)163: Brussels